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A B S T R A C T
Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the feeling that we are in control of our actions and, through them, of events in
the outside world. One inﬂuential view claims that the SoA depends on retrospectively matching the expected
and actual outcomes of action. However, recent studies have revealed an additional, prospective component to
SoA, driven by action selection processes. We used event-related potentials (ERPs) to clarify the neural
mechanisms underlying prospective agency. Subliminal priming was used to manipulate the ﬂuency of selecting
a left or right hand action in response to a supraliminal target. These actions were followed by one of several
coloured circles, after a variable delay. Participants then rated their degree of control over this visual outcome.
Incompatible priming impaired action selection, and reduced sense of agency over action outcomes, relative to
compatible priming. More negative ERPs immediately after the action, linked to post-decisional action
monitoring, were associated with reduced agency ratings over action outcomes. Additionally, feedback-related
negativity evoked by the outcome was also associated with reduced agency ratings. These ERP components may
reﬂect brain processes underlying prospective and retrospective components of sense of agency respectively.
Introduction
The sense of agency (SoA) refers to the feeling that we are in control
of our actions and, through them, of events in the outside world
(Haggard and Tsakiris, 2009). Typically, SoA ﬁgures mostly in the
background of our mental lives (Gallagher, 2012; Legrand, 2007), but
we become acutely aware of our experience of agency when the smooth
ﬂow from intention to action to outcome is disrupted (Haggard and
Chambon, 2012). Many studies have focused on the link between
actions and outcomes. The dominant view suggests that SoA relies on a
comparison between expected and observed action outcomes
(Blakemore et al., 2002; Hughes et al., 2013; Wegner and Wheatley,
1999). When there is a mismatch between expected and observed
outcomes, our SoA is reduced. According to this view, SoA depends
primarily on a match between predictive and retrospective information.
More recently, we have investigated an additional, prospective
component of the SoA, involving the mechanisms of generating the
action. Because action generation processes necessarily occur prior to
action, and are, crucially, unrelated to outcomes, this component does
not depend on retrospective information, or on the processing of
outcomes (see Chambon et al., 2014 for a review). More speciﬁcally, the
mechanisms underlying selection between alternative actions contri-
bute signiﬁcantly to SoA. Dysﬂuency, or diﬃculty, in action selection,
triggered by subliminal or supraliminal stimuli associated with a
conﬂicting response, leads to a reduction in the SoA over action
outcomes (Chambon and Haggard, 2012; Chambon et al., 2013;
Sidarus et al., 2013; Sidarus and Haggard, 2016; Wenke et al., 2010).
The neural correlates of this prospective component of SoA
(henceforth, prospective SoA for short) have been studied with fMRI
(Chambon et al., 2013), using subliminal priming to manipulate action
selection. As this experiment was the starting point for the present
work, we describe it in some detail. Participants responded to a left or
right pointing arrow with a corresponding left or right hand action.
After a variable delay, a coloured circle would appear. At the end of the
trial, participants were asked to judge how much control they felt over
that coloured circle. Importantly, and unbeknownst to the subject, a
prime arrow was subliminally presented before the visible target arrow
(Vorberg et al., 2003). If the prime arrow was compatible with the
target, i.e. pointed in the same direction, action selection was facili-
tated, leading to shorter reaction times (RTs). When the prime was
incompatible with the target, i.e. pointed in the opposite direction,
action selection was impaired, as evidenced by slower RTs and more
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errors. These incompatible priming trials were associated with lower
agency ratings, relative to compatible priming. FMRI results showed
that activity in the angular gyrus (AG) was related to a loss of agency in
incompatible priming trials, such that trials with greater AG activity
were associated with lower agency ratings. Notably, this activation
pattern was modelled during the action selection period, between
prime onset and action, thus before the outcome was known, and long
before agency ratings were given.
The poor temporal resolution of fMRI does not permit a more
detailed investigation of the temporal dynamics of prospective signals
to SoA. In contrast to fMRI, the higher temporal resolution of EEG may
help diﬀerentiate prospective processes linked to action monitoring,
from later retrospective processes linked to outcome monitoring. Here
we used event-related potentials (ERP), and the aforementioned
subliminal priming task (Chambon et al., 2013), to investigate the
contribution of three distinct stages of processing to SoA, locked to the
target, the action, and the outcome. We next brieﬂy consider the role of
each, based on previous literature.
Action monitoring
ERP studies of action priming have shown that incompatible prime-
target combinations are associated with an N2 component, 200–
350 ms after target onset, which is absent or greatly reduced for
compatible priming (Hughes et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2013; Verleger
and Jaskowski, 2008; Wang et al., 2013). A similar component was
previously identiﬁed using the Eriksen ﬂanker task, when distractors
are incompatible with a central target (e.g. HHSHH; Kopp et al., 1996).
The N2 component is thought to reﬂect pre-response conﬂict detection
and resolution (Donkers and van Boxtel, 2004; Yeung et al., 2004). N2
amplitude is linked to both the degree of conﬂict in a given task, and of
cognitive control recruited to resolve conﬂict (Larson et al., 2014). We
therefore predicted that the N2 to the target stimulus would be larger
following incompatible, relative to compatible, priming. Moreover, as
N2 amplitude is thought to reﬂect the degree of conﬂict, it might serve
as an early index of action selection dysﬂuency, and in turn be
associated with prospective SoA. Thus, we predicted that larger N2
amplitude would be related with a reduction in SoA.
A recent transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study showed
that disrupting the inferior parietal lobe (to target the AG), both before
and immediately after the action, abolished action priming eﬀects on
SoA (Chambon et al., 2015). This suggests that action monitoring even
after action execution is related to the eﬀects of action selection ﬂuency
on SoA. Crucially, this post-decisional action monitoring occurs before,
and independently of, outcome monitoring. Therefore, it can provide a
prospective signal to SoA.
The error-related negativity (ERN) is a well-known component in
response-locked ERPs, elicited within 100 ms of erroneous responses,
with a fronto-central scalp distribution, and thought to index post-
decisional conﬂict monitoring (for reviews, see Larson et al., 2014;
Yeung and Summerﬁeld, 2012). Even in correct trials, the correct-
related negativity (CRN) has been argued to reﬂect similar processes.
Studies on metacognition have shown that these response-related
negativities (C/ERN) scaled with conﬁdence judgements, with most
negative potentials for high conﬁdence of an error, average when
uncertain, to least negative for high conﬁdence in being correct (Boldt
and Yeung, 2015; Scheﬀers and Coles, 2000). A larger CRN has also
been associated with greater objective uncertainty or diﬃculty in
perceptual discrimination tasks (Endrass et al., 2012; Pailing and
Segalowitz, 2004). Because post-decisional monitoring allows the
integration of initial conﬂict signals with information about conﬂict
resolution processes, the CRN may serve to signal a continued need for
cognitive control (Grützmann et al., 2014). Therefore, as a post-
response index of selection dysﬂuency, we hypothesised that the CRN
might be associated with prospective SoA, with a larger CRN being
associated with a reduction in SoA.
Outcome monitoring
Previous ERP studies on SoA have shown that voluntary actions
lead to an attenuation of outcome processing, relative to comparable
externally-triggered events (Gentsch and Schütz-Bosbach, 2011; Kühn
et al., 2011; Timm et al., 2013). Sensory attenuation of outcomes has
been proposed as a marker of agency also in behavioural studies
(Blakemore et al., 1998; Shergill et al., 2005). However, sensory
attenuation depends on outcomes being highly predictable, close in
time to the action (see Hughes et al., 2013 for a review), and high in
salience (Reznik et al., 2015). Therefore, under conditions of uncer-
tainty about the outcome, such as during the learning of new action-
outcome associations, sensory attenuation may be less relevant to
outcome monitoring.
Another well-known outcome monitoring component is the feed-
back-related negativity (FRN), a fronto-central component seen around
250–300 ms after outcome feedback. This is generally larger following
negative or unexpected feedback (for reviews, see San Martín, 2012;
Ullsperger et al., 2014). The reinforcement learning account (Holroyd
and Coles, 2002; Holroyd et al., 2008) suggests that the FRN reﬂects
dopaminergic prediction-error signals, with worse than expected out-
comes resulting in a larger FRN. The expectancy-deviation account
(Oliveira et al., 2007) proposes that the FRN is associated with ACC-
mediated monitoring and learning of action-outcome associations
more generally. Mismatches between expected and observed outcomes
would result in greater ACC activation, and larger FRN, serving to
signal a need for cognitive control, and updating of internal models of
action-outcome contingencies. Moreover, previous studies comparing
FRN between gains and losses have shown greater FRN sensitivity
associated with outcomes perceived as contingent, relative to non-
contingent, on action (Yeung et al., 2005); and with greater perceived
responsibility over outcomes (Li et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011).
However, the terminology for this component has been disputed.
Novel or surprising events can elicit an N2 component, with a similar
latency and scalp distribution, which could be confounded with, or
reﬂect similar mechanisms to, the FRN (Folstein and Van Petten, 2008;
Wessel et al., 2012). On another view, this component would be best
described as a positive-going potential for positive outcomes, termed
feedback-correct related positivity (fCRP; Holroyd et al., 2008; Oliveira
et al., 2007). In fact, a recent study on agency attribution showed that a
smaller fCRP (or more negative potentials) were associated with
outcomes that were externally- vs. self-attributed (Bednark and
Franz, 2014). Irrespective of naming conventions, these ﬁndings
generally agree that less negative (or more positive) potentials, similar
to the FRN, are typically associated with correct, expected, or reward-
ing outcomes, and thus could be a putative correlate of greater SoA. To
place our ﬁndings within the context of an outcome/performance
monitoring framework (e.g. San Martín, 2012; Ullsperger et al.,
2014), we will use the FRN label to refer to this hypothesised substrate
of the retrospective component of SoA.
Present study
The present study aimed to investigate putative neural correlates of
SoA. Each trial involved subliminal action primes, supraliminal target
stimuli, manual responses to those targets, a delayed visual outcome,
and an explicit judgement of agency (Chambon et al., 2013). We
measured candidate ERPs to diﬀerent events in this sequence, to
investigate potential neural correlates of prospective and retrospective
components contributing to SoA (see Fig. 1). A putative neural
correlate of prospective SoA should occur prior to any action outcome,
thus be related to action monitoring, and should correlate with agency
ratings. Finally, we included both free choice and instructed trials, to
investigate whether the endogenous vs. exogenous origins of action
contribute similarly to SoA.
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Materials and methods
Participants
Thirty-ﬁve participants were recruited via a UCL online database, to
obtain a desired sample size of 24, based on an a priori power
calculation (given Cohen's dz=0.65 for within-subjects comparison of
compatibility eﬀect on agency ratings Chambon et al. (2013),
power=0.8, alpha=0.05). All were right-handed, with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, did not suﬀer from colour blindness, and
had no history of psychiatric or neurological disorders. Participants
received payment of £7.50/hour. Written informed consent was
obtained from all participants. The study had ethical approval from
the UCL Research Ethics Committee. Seven participants were excluded
due to high artefact rejection rates (above 30% of the data). Three
participants were excluded as they were uncooperative, or did not
adequately follow instructions (e.g. repeatedly falling asleep during
study; reported pre-deciding their response prior to each trial; reported
in debrieﬁng that they based their agency ratings on colour preference
rather than on the relation to their own action). One further participant
was excluded because they may have consciously perceived the primes
(post-test d’=0.65, over 2 SD's above the group mean d’=0.02,
SD=0.21). Twenty-four participants remained (12 females, mean
age=24.38, SD=4.90).
Apparatus and materials
The experiment was programmed using Psychophysics Toolbox v3
(Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997). Stimuli were
presented on a mid-grey background, on a 17’’ CRT monitor (75 Hz
refresh rate) positioned at approximately 60 cm distance from partici-
pants. Prime and mask stimuli consisted of left- or right-pointing
arrows, presented in dark grey. Primes subtended visual angles of
0.8°×1.86°, and masks 1.09°×3.47°. Prime and mask could appear
randomly 1.38° above or below ﬁxation to enhance the masking eﬀect
(Vorberg et al., 2003). Each action was followed by a visual stimulus in
one of 8 colours (see later) subtending 3.8°.
Design and procedure
Agency task. In the main task, participants had to respond to a target
arrow with left or right hand action, which would trigger the
appearance of a visual outcome – a coloured circle (see Fig. 2 below
for an outline of the paradigm). At the end of a trial, they were asked to
rate how much control they felt they had over the visual outcome they
had just seen.
In forced choice trials, a directional arrow (pointing randomly to
the left or right) instructed participants to perform the corresponding
left or right hand action. In free choice trials, a bi-directional arrow
indicated that participants could choose themselves whether to make a
left or right hand action. Participants were instructed to try and make
their choices as spontaneously as possible, and avoid deciding in
advance of a trial, but at the same time, to try to choose each hand
about 50% of the time. To ensure similar number of trials across
actions, feedback was given at the end of each block on the percentage
of left and right hand choices. Forced and free choice trials were
randomised, and equiprobable.
Primes and actions could either be compatible or incompatible. In
forced choice trials, prime direction could be the same as the target
direction, and thus would also be compatible with the action, or primes
might point in the opposite direction as the target arrow, and be
incompatible with the action. Prime-action compatibility was deter-
mined online for free choice trials. When participants chose the action
suggested by the prime, i.e. a left action following a left prime, trials
were classed as compatible. Trials were classed as incompatible when
participants chose the opposite action to the prime (i.e. a right action).
Crucially, the outcome colours were not directly related to the
Experimental 
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Fig. 1. Schematic outline of the experimental paradigm with the putative cognitive processes involved at diﬀerent stages of voluntary action. These processes are thought to be
respectively indexed by the neural markers measured here. The ERP components thought to index action monitoring processes, i.e. Target-locked N2 and Action-locked correct related
negativity (CRN), are hypothesised to relate to the prospective component of SoA. The Outcome-locked feedback-related negativity (FRN) is thought to index outcome monitoring, and
hence is hypothesised to reﬂect the retrospective component of SoA.
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primes alone, or to the actions alone. Rather, the outcome colour was
based on the combination of prime and target, or prime and action, so
that compatible and incompatible trials were associated with diﬀerent
colours. Further, diﬀerent colours were used for free and forced
choices. Hence, within a block, 4 colours were associated with each
choice condition. Of these, two colours were associated with each
action, one for each level of prime-action compatibility (cf. Wenke
et al., 2010). Moreover, to ensure that the frequency of each coloured
outcome was equal despite diﬀerences in error rates for compatible and
incompatible priming, error trials were replaced at the end of a block.
Finally, to exclude any idiosyncratic preference eﬀects, the colours were
latin square rotated across 8 blocks of trials, so that each colour
appeared once in each choice×action×compatibility condition. An extra
block of trials with a random assignment of colours to conditions was
completed at the end of the 8 blocks. This block was included to detect
any anomalous use of the rating scale, but was not otherwise analysed.
The interval between action and outcome was randomly either 400
or 600 ms. The minimum interval of 400 ms between action and
outcome helped to reduce the inﬂuence of action-related components
on the outcome-locked ERP (Hughes and Waszak, 2011). Action-
outcome interval was jittered because variation in temporal contiguity
was predicted to lead to varying sense of agency, and thus to reduce
stereotyped agency judgements (Haggard et al., 2002; Wenke et al.,
2010). Interval duration was orthogonal to the factors of interest in the
present study (choice, action and prime-action compatibility).
A trial started with a central ﬁxation cross presented for 700 ms.
Primes were shown for 13.3 ms and, after a 40 ms delay, the target/
mask stimulus was displayed for 250 ms. Previous studies have shown
that these parameters allow for robust priming eﬀects, without con-
scious perception of primes (Vorberg et al., 2003). Participants were
instructed to respond as quickly as possible to the target arrow by
pressing a corresponding left or right arrow key, or to choose which
action to make when bi-directional targets were shown. If they pressed
the wrong key (in forced choice trials), or were too slow ( > 1.2 s), a
black cross appeared, indicating an error. Otherwise, after a variable
delay a coloured circle would appear, for 1 s. Participants were
instructed to pay attention to the relation between their action and
the coloured circle that followed. To prevent EEG artefacts, partici-
pants were instructed not to blink until after the coloured circle
disappeared.
After a variable delay between 1 and 2 s, the agency rating scale was
presented until participants made a response. Participants were asked
to judge how much control they felt over the coloured circle, on a
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 to 9 (1=very little control, 9=very
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 91 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
How much control? How much control? How much control? How much control?
No
control
Total
control
No
control
Total
control
No
control
Total
control
No
control
Total
control
Compatible Incompatible Compatible Incompatible
Free Forced
Prime vs.
Action:
Choice:
Fixation
(700 ms)
Prime
(13.3 ms)
(40 ms)
Target/Mask
(250 ms)
Action
(RT)
Outcome
(1 s)
(400 or
600 ms)
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Ratings
(1-2 s)
Fig. 2. Experimental paradigm. Left or right subliminal prime arrows were brieﬂy ﬂashed before a target arrow, containing a metacontrast mask. Participants responded to the target by
either following the instruction of directional arrows, or choosing which action to perform in response to the bi-directional (free choice) arrow. Primes and actions could be compatible
(left prime – left action) or incompatible (left prime – right action). Actions triggered the onset of a visual outcome, after a variable delay. At the end of the trial, participants gave agency
ratings.
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strong control). They were asked to judge how strongly they felt that
the action they had just made was related to the colour that followed.
They were further asked to use the whole range of the scale, to indicate
diﬀerences between cases in which they felt more control over the
colour (using higher ratings) compared to when they felt less in control
(using lower ratings). [See Supplementary materials for histograms of
agency ratings across participants.] Inter-trial intervals varied ran-
domly between 1 and 1.5 s.
The study started with a training block of 48 trials. If participants
felt conﬁdent about the task and agency ratings, they proceeded to
main experiment. The main experiment consisted of 8 blocks of 64
trials. Participants could take small breaks between the blocks. After
the main experiment, participants were debriefed on the presence of
primes and completed a prime awareness test.
Prime awareness test. To assess whether primes remained subliminal
for all participants, after the main experiment participants were
debriefed about the presence of primes and completed a prime
awareness test. This task resembled the main experiment, except
without any colours following the action, or agency ratings.
Participants were instructed to press the left- or right-arrow key
according to the direction of the prime arrow, ignoring the
supraliminal target arrow. To avoid possible response biases induced
by directional targets (Vermeiren and Cleeremans, 2012), only the bi-
directional arrow target was used. Additionally, a delay was introduced
after mask presentation in which participants could not respond
(Wenke et al., 2010). This served to prevent conscious reports from
being biased by unconscious motor activations triggered by primes
(Vorberg et al., 2003). This delay varied randomly between 600 and
800 ms, with an auditory tone (600 Hz, 150 ms duration) signalling
that participants could respond. This test consisted of 3 blocks of 60
trials.
EEG recording and analysis
EEG was acquired with a 64 channel BioSemi Active-Two system
(Biosemi Inc, Amsterdam, Netherlands) and sampled at 512 Hz. The
CMS (common mode sense) and DRL (driven right leg) electrodes were
used as reference and ground electrodes. Additional electrodes were
placed on the left and right mastoid. Vertical and horizontal EOGs were
recorded from electrodes placed above and below the right eye and on
the outer canthi of the left and right eyes.
EEG data analysis was performed with Fieldtrip (Oostenveld et al.,
2011) and custom-built Matlab scripts (MATLAB 8.1, The MathWorks
Inc., Natick, MA, 2013). All channels were 0.1–30 Hz band-pass
ﬁltered, and re-referenced to average mastoids. An automatic artefact
rejection procedure was employed. To identify epochs with eye-blink
artefacts, EOG channels were bandpass ﬁltered from 1–15 Hz
(Butterworth ﬁlter, 4th order) and any epochs with activity exceeding
+/−60 µV were rejected. Additionally, any epochs where EEG activity
exceeded +/−60 µV were excluded. Due to recording diﬃculties with
some subjects, and given that these electrodes were not of interest, the
following channels were excluded from analysis: T7, T8, TP7, TP8, P9
and P10. In four participants, 1 channel had to be interpolated due to
abnormal noise (P7, AF3, F5 and P2 for each participant respectively).
Error trials, in which participants pressed the wrong key after a forced
choice target (M=3.26% SD=2.66), or exceeded the response window (
> 1.2 s; M=1.54% SD=1.33) were excluded.
Target-locked ERPs. Target-locked epochs were selected from 200 ms
pre-stimulus to 600 ms after. Baseline correction was applied with a
100 ms interval prior to prime onset (−155 to −55 ms). Separate ERPs
were calculated for each choice and priming condition. Based on
previous studies (Larson et al., 2014) and observation of grand ERPs
and scalp topography, the Target N2 component was analysed as the
average amplitude at Cz, between 250 and 325 ms.
Action-locked ERPs. Action-locked epochs were selected from 600 ms
before the action to 400 ms after, with a 100 ms baseline before action.
Based on previous studies on the Error and Correct Related Negativity
(ERN/CRN; e.g. Boldt and Yeung, 2015; Scheﬀers and Coles, 2000),
CRN was measured as the average amplitude at FCz from 0 to 100 ms
after the action. Although some diﬀerences between conditions can be
seen in the action-locked ERPs more than 100 ms post-action in
Fig. 4c, these were not analysed since they did not correspond to our
a priori ERP components of interest. The ERP plots are nonetheless
presented for completeness.
Outcome-locked ERPs. Outcome-locked epochs were selected from
200 ms before stimulus to 600 ms after, with a 100 ms pre-stimulus
baseline. Feedback Related Negativity (FRN) was measured as the
average amplitude from 250 to 300 ms at FCz, based on observation of
the data and previous research (Yeung et al., 2005).
Trials with available artefact-free epochs locked to all three events
(target, action, and outcome) were identiﬁed, and matched to the
behavioural data. This resulted in an average N trials=92, min=45,
across choice×priming conditions. ERP components were analysed
with hierarchical linear regression models (also known as linear mixed-
eﬀects models). This approach, unlike classical ANOVA models, per-
forms well with unbalanced data (Baayen et al., 2008; Bagiella et al.,
2000; Tibon and Levy, 2015). Additionally, it allowed us to investigate
the relation between agency ratings and ERP components, by model-
ling single-trial level data with continuous predictors. Analyses were
conducted using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2014) in R (R Core
Team, 2015). Parameter estimates (b) and their associated t-tests (t, p),
calculated using the Satterthwaite approximation for degrees of free-
dom (Kuznetsova et al., 2015), are presented to show the magnitude of
the eﬀects, with bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence intervals. Plots of model
predictions were obtained from 10,000 simulations from the posterior
distribution of plausible parameter values under uniform priors
(Gelman and Su, 2015).
For display purposes only, but not for statistical analysis, agency
ratings were median split to demonstrate the relation between neural
processes indexed by ERP components and SoA. For each subject, and
for each choice and priming condition, median agency rating values
were obtained, and trials were classed as low or high agency ratings
with respect to the median.
Results
Agency task
Mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA), with the factors choice (free vs. forced) and priming
condition (compatible vs. incompatible). This revealed a signiﬁcant
main eﬀect of choice (F(1,23)=5.92, p=0.023,ƞp
2=0.21), such that free
choice trials led to slower RTs than forced choice (free: M=432.11,
SD=147.69; forced: M=420.65, SD=124.11). There was also a signiﬁ-
cant main eﬀect of prime-action compatibility (F(1, 23)=74.36, p <
0.001,
ƞp
2=0.76), as predicted, with slower RTs for prime incompatible actions
than prime compatible actions (compatible: M=414.95, SD=34.12;
incompatible: M=440.52, SD=31.82; see Fig. 3a). The interaction was
not signiﬁcant (F(1, 23)=1.98, p=0.17, ƞp
2=0.079).
In free choice trials, prime compatible choices were made on 59%
(SD=0.06) of trials, revealing a choice bias. A one-sample t-test
revealed this was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from chance level of 50%
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(t(23)=7.12, p < 0.001, dz=2.97; see Fig. 3b). For forced choice trials,
error rates for prime compatible and incompatible actions were
submitted to a paired-samples t-test. This showed that participants
made signiﬁcantly more errors when primes were incompatible with
the target, compared to compatible (M =9.10%, SD=6.26 and
M=4.28%, SD=4.71, respectively; t(23)=−5.55, p < 0.001, dz=−2.31;
see Fig. 3c).
Agency ratings were submitted to a 2×2×2 repeated measures
ANOVA, with factors of choice (free vs. forced), prime-action compat-
ibility (compatible vs. incompatible) and action-outcome interval (400
vs. 600 ms). Results showed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of choice
(F(1,23)=4.45, p=0.046, ƞp
2=0.16), with higher ratings in free, compared
to forced, choice trials (free: M=5.26, SD=0.44; forced: M=5.01,
SD=0.40, see Fig. 3d). A signiﬁcant main eﬀect of prime-action
compatibility was also found (F(1,23)=10.42, p=0.004, ƞp
2=0.31), with
compatible priming leading to higher agency ratings than incompatible
priming (M=5.30, SD=0.41 and M=5.05, SD=0.46 respectively). The
interaction between choice and priming was not signiﬁcant
(F(1,23)=2.96, p=0.099, ƞp
2=0.11). Finally, there was no eﬀect of
action-outcome interval, nor any interaction with the other factors
(Fs < 1). Action-outcome interval did inﬂuence agency ratings in
previous studies (Chambon et al., 2014), but those studies used more
intervals and a wider range than the present study. Importantly,
action-outcome interval was not a key factor of interest here, and did
not interact with the other factors. Therefore, it will not be discussed
further.
ERPs
ERP analyses focused on three neural processes that might inform
SoA, at three diﬀerent time points in the trial. Processes related to
action monitoring were assessed at pre- and post-response stages, by
analysing the target-locked N2 (Target N2) and the action-locked CRN
(Action CRN) components, respectively. Finally, the outcome-locked
FRN (Outcome FRN) was assessed as an index of outcome processing.
Action monitoring
Pre-response – Target N2. Using hierarchical linear regression, N2
amplitude was predicted from choice and priming condition (coded as
1/−1 for free/forced choice and as 1/−1 for compatible/incompatible
priming), and choice by priming interaction, as ﬁxed eﬀects.
Participants were modelled as random intercepts and random slope
eﬀects. RTs and their interactions with other factors were entered as
ﬁxed covariates, after ﬁrst log-transforming the RT data, to render the
distribution more normal, and standardizing it within participants.
The model predicting the Target N2 revealed a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of priming condition (b=0.34, t(34)=2.41, p=0.022, 95%
CI=[0.081, 0.61]), a signiﬁcant negative relation with RTs (b=−1.98,
t(8325)=−17.04, p < 0.001, 95% CI=[−2.20, −.1.75]), and a signiﬁcant
interaction between priming and RTs (b=−0.25, t(8449)=−2.13,
p=0.033, 95% CI=[−0.45, −0.015]). No signiﬁcant eﬀect of choice,
nor any other interactions were found (see Table S1 in Supplementary
materials, for full results). These results showed that greater N2
amplitudes (more negative potentials) occurred for incompatible
priming trials, relative to compatible priming (see Fig. 4a).
Additionally, greater N2 amplitudes were associated with slower RTs.
To probe the interaction between priming condition and RTs, point
estimates and standard errors were obtained from model predictions at
+/− 1 SDs of the RTs, and one sample t-tests were performed, using a
conservative N-1 degrees of freedom (Snijders and Bosker, 1999). The
priming×RTs interaction (see Fig. S1) showed that the compatibility
eﬀect on Target N2 amplitude (greater N2 for incompatible) was
largest for fast RTs (−1 SD RT: b=1.17, t(23)=3.17, p=0.004), still
robust at average RTs (mean RT: b=0.67,t(23)=2.41, p=0.024), but no
longer statistically signiﬁcant for slow RTs (+1 SD RT: b=0.18,
t(23)=0.49, p=0.63). These results are broadly consistent with an
association between the Target N2 and conﬂict monitoring and
resolution processes.
Post-response – Action CRN. The same analysis model was also
applied to the mean Action CRN amplitude. The Action CRN model
revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of priming (b=−0.27, t(24)=−2.12, p=0.044,
95% CI=[−0.52, −0.008]), a signiﬁcant relation with RTs (b=−0.54,
t(8485)=−5.55, p < 0.001, 95% CI=[−0.73, −0.33]), and a signiﬁcant
priming by RTs interaction (b=0.37, t(8667)=3.85, p < 0.001, 95%
CI=[0.19, 0.56]). No eﬀects of choice, nor any other interactions
were found (see Table S2).
Larger CRN amplitude (more negative potentials) was associated
with compatible, relative to incompatible, priming (see Fig. 4c).
Additionally, larger CRN was associated with slower RTs. Model
predictions and point estimates were again used to assess the priming
by RTs interaction (see Fig. S2). First, the relation between Action CRN
and RTs was assessed separately for each priming condition. For
compatible priming, CRN amplitude was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
between fast (−1 SD) and slow (+1 SD) RT trials (b=−0.33, t(23)=−1.27,
p=0.22). However, for incompatible priming, there was a signiﬁcant
negative relation between RTs and CRN amplitude, such that slower
RTs were associated with larger CRN than faster RTs (+1 vs −1 SD RT:
b=−1.82, t(23)=−6.30, p < 0.001). This revealed that the interaction
between priming and RTs was driven by a modulation of CRN
amplitude across RTs in incompatible priming trials, but not in
compatible trials. Second, CRN amplitude was compared across
priming conditions. This showed that the compatibility eﬀect – smaller
CRN for incompatible versus compatible trials – was largest for fast
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RTs (−1 SD RT: b=−1.29, t(23)=−3.97, p=0.001) and reduced for
average RTs (mean RT: b=−0.54, t(23)=−2.12, p=0.045). For slow
RTs (+1 SD), the compatibility eﬀect was no longer signiﬁcant (b=0.20,
t(23)=0.64, p=0.53), but reversed at very slow RTs (+2 SD RT: b=0.95,
t(23)=2.07, p=0.050). Together, these results are consistent with an
association between Action CRN and post-response conﬂict monitor-
ing. They further point to the possibility that the CRN could be
suppressed in incompatible priming trials in which conﬂict is well
resolved, resulting in fast or average RTs.
To test a possible trade-oﬀ between pre- and post-response conﬂict
monitoring, indexed by the Target N2 and Action CRN respectively,
mean Target N2 amplitude (standardised within-subjects) was added
as a ﬁxed covariate to the previous Action CRN model. Indeed, results
showed a signiﬁcant negative relation between Target N2 and Action
CRN (b=−0.94, t(8775)=−10.02, p < 0.001, 95% CI=[−1.14, −0.74], see
Table S3). Larger Target N2 (more negative potential) was associated
with a smaller Action CRN (more positive potential). Notably, the
Target N2 seemed to explain some of the variance previously accounted
for by the main eﬀect of priming, as priming now became only a
marginal predictor of Action CRN (b=−0.24, t(24)=1.91, p=0.069, 95%
CI=[−0.52, 0.023]), whereas RTs became a stronger predictor
(b=−0.71, t(8495)=−7.27, p < 0.001, 95% CI=[−0.89, −0.53]). The
priming by RTs interaction remained signiﬁcant (b=0.35,
t(8663)=−3.62, p < 0.001, 95% CI=[0.15, 0.53]). These results support
a distinction between pre- and post-response conﬂict monitoring, as
the latter may integrate initial conﬂict signals with actual conﬂict
resolution.
Outcome monitoring
To test the hypothesis that manipulating action selection ﬂuency
may aﬀect SoA by altering outcome processing, we modelled Outcome
FRN by choice and priming condition, and their interaction, as both
ﬁxed and participant random eﬀects. Results showed no signiﬁcant
eﬀects of choice (b=−0.015, t(23)=−0.085, p=0.93, 95% CI=[−0.36,
0.31]), priming (b=−0.094, t(42)=−0.75, p=0.93, 95% CI=[−0.33,
0.15]), or choice×priming interaction (b=0.13, t(29)=1.00, p=0.33,
95% CI=[−0.12, 0.39]; see Table S4). Therefore, we found no evidence
that Outcome FRN was aﬀected by our manipulations of action
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selection (see Fig. 4e).
Additionally, we tested a possible relation between Action CRN and
Outcome FRN, by adding Action CRN to the previous Outcome FRN
model. The new model revealed no signiﬁcant eﬀect of Action CRN
(b=−0.087, t(8778)=−0.76, p=0.45, 95% CI=[−0.32, 0.15]; see Table
S5). Since null eﬀects cannot be clearly interpreted within frequentist
statistics, Bayesian hypothesis testing (Wagenmakers, 2007) was used
to further probe this relation. By comparing the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC) between a model with a predictor (alternative hypoth-
esis) and a model without that predictor (null hypothesis), a Bayes
factor can be approximated in order to weigh the evidence for or
against the null hypothesis, i.e. that the predictor is not related to the
dependent variable. Comparing the BIC for the previous, null model
with the new, alternative model yielded a Bayes factor of 70.52,
indicating strong evidence for the null hypothesis of no association
between Action CRN and Outcome FRN.
Predicting agency ratings
Finally, we modelled agency ratings to investigate the neural
correlates of the subjective experience of agency. As above, the
experimental factors of choice and priming were entered as ﬁxed and
participant random eﬀects. Target N2, Action CRN and Outcome FRN,
as well as RTs (log-transformed), were entered as ﬁxed covariates
(standardised within-subjects). Importantly, including the RTs as a
predictor in the model ensures that other eﬀects, such as priming
eﬀects, are estimated after taking into account the possible contribu-
tion of RTs.
Considering the experimental factors, results were consistent with
the previous analysis: there was a signiﬁcant eﬀect of priming (b=0.10,
t(23)=2.45, p=0.022, 95% CI=[0.027, 0.20]), a marginal eﬀect of choice
(b=0.15, t(23)=2.06, p=0.051, 95% CI=[0.001, 0.30]), and no signiﬁcant
choice×priming interaction (b=0.023, t(23)=0.56, p=0.58, 95%
CI=[−0.061, 0.11]; see Fig. 5 and Table S6). The reduced eﬀect of
choice on agency ratings seen here, relative to the ANOVA analysis
above, is due to the EEG artefact rejection procedures. Only trials with
ERP data in all 3 time windows could be used for the ERP analysis,
whereas all correct trials were used for behavioural data analysis.
The model further showed a signiﬁcant negative relation between
agency ratings and RTs (b=−0.15, t(8726)=−5.94, p < 0.001, 95%
CI=[−0.20, −0.097]), such that slower RTs were associated with lower
agency ratings. This shows that RT monitoring may partly contribute to
SoA. Notwithstanding that, results show that the eﬀect of priming on
SoA could not be fully explained by diﬀerences in RTs across priming
conditions.
Turning to the putative neural correlates of agency, it had been
hypothesised that Target N2, as a pre-response index of conﬂict
monitoring, might be related to agency ratings. Larger Target N2
amplitudes (more negative potentials) would imply stronger response
conﬂict and hence be associated with lower agency ratings. However,
the model revealed no signiﬁcant eﬀect of Target N2 (b=−0.023,
t(8754)=−0.92, p=0.36, 95% CI=[−0.070, 0.020]; see Fig. 4b).
Comparing the previous model, which included the Target N2 as a
predictor, to a model without the Target N2 predictor (null hypothesis),
resulted in a Bayes factor of 61.46, indicating strong evidence for the
null hypothesis of no relation between Target N2 and agency ratings.
The degree of conﬂict experienced, or of cognitive control recruited,
during initial action selection was not directly related to SoA.
Alternatively, as an index of post-response action monitoring, it was
hypothesised that Action CRN could be related to SoA. Indeed, Action
CRN was found to have a signiﬁcant positive relation to agency ratings
(b=0.079, t(8760)=3.22, p=0.001, 95% CI=[0.026, 0.13]). Larger Action
CRN amplitudes (more negative potentials) were associated with lower
agency ratings (see Fig. 4d), consistent with a role of Action CRN in
post-response conﬂict monitoring, with unresolved conﬂict leading to
greater Action CRN, and thus a reduction in SoA.
Finally, looking at neural correlates of outcome processing, we
found a signiﬁcant positive relation between Outcome FRN and agency
ratings (b=0.13, t(8760)=5.52, p < 0.001, 95% CI=[0.084, 0.18]). Larger
Outcome FRN amplitudes (more negative potentials) were associated
with lower agency ratings (see Fig. 4f). The Outcome FRN may indicate
a violation of outcome expectations, or more negative responses to the
outcomes, thus leading to a reduction in SoA.
Supplementary analyses were conducted to test the robustness of
the observed eﬀects.1 First, we checked that the observed association
between Action CRN and agency ratings did not result from possible
confounds introduced by baselining the Action-locked ERP in the
active period before the action. For this, we computed Action-locked
ERPs that used the same neutral baseline as that used for the Target-
locked ERPs (see Supplementary analysis A). Results conﬁrmed that
the Action CRN remained a signiﬁcant predictor of agency ratings
(b=0.06, t(8735)=2.58, p=0.010, 95% CI=[0.01, 0.11]; see Table S7).
Second, we assessed whether our results might change across trials
during the course of each block, as participants learn action-outcome
associations. We might hypothesise that: a) agency ratings could
increase across the block; b) this change could, in turn, alter the
relation between ERPs and agency ratings; or c) the relation between
ERPs and agency ratings might itself change across the trials. In
particular, as the Outcome FRN is sensitive to unexpected or unpre-
dicted outcomes, this signal might become less relevant to SoA as
action-outcome contingencies are learned. Predictions about changes
in the contribution of action-related ERPs (Target N2 and Action CRN)
to agency during learning remain less clear. Yet, one might hypothesise
a trade-oﬀ between relying on outcome monitoring in an initial
learning phase, and later relying on action monitoring, as outcomes
are well learned.
To test these hypotheses, we extended the agency model described
above (with the original Action CRN, with a pre-action baseline), by
adding trial as linear and quadratic predictors. Additionally, hypothesis
ii) was tested by including interactions between a linear eﬀect of trial
and the 3 ERP components (details in Supplementary analysis B, and
Table S8). Results showed that indeed agency ratings increased as
participants learned action-outcome associations, with large linear and
quadratic eﬀects of trial (linear: b=5.72, t(8370)=30.18, p < 0.001, 95%
CI=[5.32, 6.09]; quadratic: b=−1.75, t(8367)=−9.24, p < 0.001, 95%
CI=[−2.11, −1.39]). Importantly, both Action CRN and Outcome
FRN remained signiﬁcant predictors of agency ratings (Action CRN:
b=0.07, t(8373)=2.77, p=0.006, 95% CI=[0.02, 0.12]; Outcome FRN:
b=0.13, t(8373)=5.50, p < 0.001, 95% CI=[0.08, 0.17]). Therefore, the
eﬀects of trial number on agency ratings did not account for the
relations between these ERPs components and agency ratings.
Moreover, the linear eﬀect of trial did not interact with the Target
N2, nor with the Action CRN components (Trial×Target N2: b=−0.06,
t(8367)=−0.31, p=0.76, 95% CI=[−0.45, 0.38]; Trial×Action CRN:
b=−0.06, t(8366)=−0.31, p=0.76, 95% CI=[−0.42, 0.33]). Thus, action
monitoring had a stable eﬀect on agency ratings, independent of
Choice X Priming
Outcome FRN
Action CRN
Target N2
Reaction Times
Priming
Choice
−0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Parameter Estimates
Agency Ratings Model
Fig. 5. Parameter estimates for the model predicting agency ratings , with 95%
bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals.
1 We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer for directing us towards these extra
analyses.
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instrumental learning and outcome monitoring. Interestingly, the
linear eﬀect of trial did interact with Outcome FRN (b=−0.58,
t(8371)=−3.07, p=0.002, 95% CI=[−0.96, −0.22]). As predicted, this
interaction showed that the eﬀect of Outcome FRN on agency ratings
gradually reduced across the trials (see Fig. S4). Hence, it was
especially in the beginning of the block that larger Outcome FRN
amplitudes were associated with a greater reduction in agency.
Discussion
The present study aimed to clarify the neural correlates of SoA, and
speciﬁcally the neural basis of prospective cues to SoA based on action
selection. Behaviourally, we found that incompatible action priming led
to slower RTs than compatible priming, in both free and forced choice
trials. Free choices were biased towards prime-compatible choices,
while incompatible priming led to more errors than compatible
priming in forced choice trials. These results are consistent with
previous subliminal priming studies including free choice trials
(Kiesel et al., 2006; O’Connor and Neill, 2011; Schlaghecken and
Eimer, 2004). More importantly, the disruption to action selection
induced by incompatible priming led to a reduction in agency ratings
over action outcomes, relative to compatible priming (Chambon and
Haggard, 2012; Chambon et al., 2013, 2015; Sidarus et al., 2013;
Wenke et al., 2010). Additionally, free choice trials led to a stronger
SoA than forced choice trials (cf. Wenke et al., 2010), but response
conﬂict had a similar eﬀect on SoA for both choice conditions, in line
with previous studies (Sidarus and Haggard, 2016; Wenke et al., 2010).
At a neural level, we identiﬁed ERP components associated with SoA at
the time of the action, and also at the time of the outcome. Based on
previous work, these components could be identiﬁed with action
monitoring and outcome monitoring, respectively (recall Fig. 1).
Action monitoring
Previous studies into the neural correlates of prospective cues to
SoA (Chambon et al., 2013, 2015) had not been able to disentangle the
role of pre- and post-decisional action monitoring stages to SoA. The
high temporal resolution of EEG allowed us to investigate this
question. Broadly, components that occur early, and are related to
target processing, reﬂect pre-decisional monitoring, while components
that occur later, namely at the time of the action, reﬂect post-decisional
monitoring processes.
As predicted, we found evidence of pre-response conﬂict monitor-
ing, with a larger Target N2 associated with incompatible priming trials
(Hughes et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2013; Verleger and Jaskowski, 2008;
Wang et al., 2013). Moreover, we found that larger Target N2
amplitude was related to slower RTs, in line with previous studies
(Beste et al., 2008; Yeung et al., 2004; Yeung and Nieuwenhuis, 2009).
We also found an interaction between RTs and the eﬀect of priming on
Target N2 amplitude. The compatibility eﬀect on Target N2 (more
negative amplitude for incompatible trials) was greater for fast
responses than for slow responses. A previous subliminal priming
study, that split RTs into deciles, found that the delaying eﬀects of
incompatible, relative to compatible, priming were reduced for slower
RTs (Atas and Cleeremans, 2015). Similar eﬀects have been reported
for tasks involving conscious response conﬂict (Burle et al., 2014;
Ridderinkhof, 2002a, 2002b; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). Trials with
slower RTs may already reﬂect enhanced cognitive control, resulting in
reduced response interference from incompatible primes. The observed
correlation between larger Target N2 and slower RTs for both
compatible and incompatible trials supports this view, as well as the
suggestion that Target N2 reﬂects the recruitment of cognitive control.
Intriguingly, the Target N2 was comparable in incompatible priming
trials for both free and forced choices. To our knowledge this has not
been previously investigated, but seems consistent with the observed
choice bias introduced by the primes. This suggests a speciﬁc cost, or
eﬀort, is involved in ‘freely’ choosing a prime-incompatible action.
Finally, we did not ﬁnd any relationship between Target N2 amplitude
and agency ratings. This suggests that the eﬀects of action priming on
agency were not directly related to the pre-decisional monitoring of
early conﬂict signals arising during action selection.
We found a clear neural correlate of the SoA at the post-decisional
monitoring stage. Larger Action CRN was associated with lower agency
ratings. This ﬁnding is consistent with studies showing that a larger
Action CRN was related to a reduction in subjective conﬁdence (Boldt
and Yeung, 2015; Scheﬀers and Coles, 2000), as well as with increases
in objective task diﬃculty (Endrass et al., 2012; Pailing and Segalowitz,
2004). These results are thus consistent with a view of the Action CRN
as reﬂecting to post-response conﬂict monitoring (Grützmann et al.,
2014; Larson et al., 2014; Yeung et al., 2004), and/or uncertainty about
the correct response (Pailing and Segalowitz, 2004; Scheﬀers and
Coles, 2000). They further suggest that prospective signals contributing
to the SoA and to conﬁdence judgements draw on information from
post-decisional processes, which integrate early and late action selec-
tion signals, rather than rely only on pre-decisional processes.
The eﬀects of action priming on the Action CRN require further
consideration. Overall, we found that compatible priming was asso-
ciated with a larger Action CRN than incompatible priming. At ﬁrst
glance, this would seem to go against a conﬂict monitoring account,
since one might predict that incompatible priming trials would be
associated with higher conﬂict, than compatible priming, and hence
should have a larger Action CRN. Yet, the literature does not support
this prediction: to our knowledge, no previous studies using subliminal
priming have looked at compatibility eﬀects on CRN. A few studies
using the ﬂanker task have analysed conﬂict eﬀects on action-locked
ERPs for correct trials, but their results are inconsistent. In line with
our ﬁndings, one study found an overall larger Action CRN for
compatible, relative to incompatible, ﬂanker trials (Grützmann et al.,
2014). However, while others have shown non-signiﬁcant eﬀects in the
same direction (Cohen and Donner, 2013; Scheﬀers and Coles, 2000),
another study has reported the opposite eﬀect (larger Action CRN for
incompatible ﬂankers; Bartholow et al., 2005).
We additionally found that a larger Action CRN was associated with
slower RTs, consistent with a conﬂict monitoring account. Importantly,
there was a signiﬁcant interaction between priming and RTs, qualifying
the two main eﬀects. In fact, it was speciﬁcally in incompatible priming
trials that Action CRN and RTs were related, whereas for compatible
priming trials Action CRN was stable across fast and slow RTs. We
might speculate that fast RTs following incompatible primes would
reﬂect a trial in which the prime was less processed, leading to a
reduced, or absent, response conﬂict. However, this account would
predict no diﬀerence in Action CRN between compatible and incom-
patible trials for fast RTs. In fact, the current results show that
incompatible priming was associated with smaller Action CRN than
compatible priming for fast and average RTs. To account for this, we
might instead speculate that incompatible priming trials with fast RTs
could reﬂect trials with faster and/or more eﬃcient recruitment of
cognitive control processes to overcome response conﬂict. Hence, fast
incompatible trials might show a suppression of Action CRN as eﬃcient
cognitive control would be deployed before the action, whereas such
control would not be necessary in compatible priming trials. While this
proposal remains highly speculative, it would point to a complemen-
tarity, or trade-oﬀ, between pre- and post-response conﬂict monitoring
(cf. Grützmann et al., 2014; Larson et al., 2014). Interestingly, our
results showed that a larger Target N2 was associated with a smaller
Action CRN, consistent with a previous study (Grützmann et al., 2014)
that showed this relation both at the within- and the between-subject
level.
Together, these ﬁndings support the view that post-response action
monitoring integrates initial conﬂict signals with actual conﬂict resolu-
tion. Both the pre-response N2 and post-response negativities (Action
CRN/ERN) have been linked to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC),
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and are suggested to reﬂect two successive recruitment events of a
single conﬂict monitoring circuit (van Veen and Carter, 2002; Yeung
et al., 2004). If conﬂict is adequately detected and resolved before the
response, there may be no need for further conﬂict-related processing
after the response. However, if conﬂict is not fully processed before the
response, post-response conﬂict signals could be important to help
prevent future errors (Grützmann et al., 2014).
Our ﬁndings suggest that prospective SoA may be linked to a post-
decisional integration of signals both early and late in the action-
generation process (see Fig. 1). A putative role of the prospective
component of SoA may be as an experiential marker, or an epistemic
feeling (Proust, 2008), of the unfolding voluntary action. If an error is
made, corrective action may help to avoid unintended outcomes. Even
when the correct action is made, a subjective experience of diﬃculty, or
dysﬂuency, in action selection may be informative in guiding beha-
vioural adaptation, even if triggered by subliminal primes (Desender
et al., 2014). This feeling that “something went wrong” (Pacherie,
2008) might thus weaken the link between the action and ensuing
outcome, leading to a reduced SoA over the outcome. One might
hypothesise that when learning new action-outcome contingencies, it
may be adaptive to learn following ﬂuent, high-conﬁdence actions, but
not learn following dysﬂuent, low-conﬁdence, actions.
Alternatively, conﬂicts can serve as aversive signals (Botvinick,
2007). Conﬂict induces negative evaluations of subsequent neutral
stimuli (Fritz and Dreisbach, 2013), and triggers behavioural adjust-
ments in subsequent trials (Dreisbach and Fischer, 2011, 2012). In
fact, post-response negativities (CRN/ERN) have been linked to
negative aﬀect (Hajcak et al., 2004; Simon-Thomas and Knight,
2005), and to the motivational signiﬁcance of errors (Aarts et al.,
2013; Grützmann et al., 2014; Hajcak and Foti, 2008). From this
perspective, our ﬁnding of reduced SoA over outcomes following
response conﬂict could be interpreted as the negative valence of conﬂict
“leaking” into outcome evaluation.
Outcome monitoring
After outcome onset, we found that larger (more negative) Outcome
FRN amplitudes were associated with lower agency ratings. Moreover,
this relation was particularly evident at the start of a block, and
gradually reduced as action-outcome associations were learned. These
results are consistent with a recent study showing that more negative
potentials in a similar time window were associated with more external
attribution of agency over action outcomes (Bednark and Franz, 2014).
Previous studies comparing responses to gains and losses have also
shown that the FRN is sensitive to the controllability of action
outcomes (Li et al., 2010, 2011; Yeung et al., 2005).
Previous EEG studies on agency have found sensory attenuation to
self-triggered and predicted/expected outcomes in early (N1) proces-
sing (Gentsch et al., 2012; Gentsch and Schütz-Bosbach, 2011); as well
as smaller P3a for self-attributed, relative to externally-attributed,
outcomes (Kühn et al., 2011). Such studies have typically invoked
alternative agents, or violated well-learned action-outcome associa-
tions to trigger changes in SoA. Additionally, using subliminal action
priming with fully predictable outcomes, a study has found a sensory
attenuation of outcomes that followed compatibly primed, relative to
incompatibly primed, actions (Stenner et al., 2014). Notably, sensory
attenuation depends on the ability to adequately predict a sensory
event (see Hughes et al., 2013 for a review), therefore such measures
were not particularly suited to our design.
In our study, outcomes were always relatively unpredictable, as
there were many possible outcomes (8), and action-outcome contin-
gencies had to be learned anew in each block. Within a block,
participants could learn that left and right hand actions were associated
with 4 colours each, 2 for free and 2 for forced choice trials. The
compatibility relation between prime and action disambiguated the
remaining 2 colours, but this information was not available since the
primes were subliminal. Participants were asked to learn these
relatively complex action-outcome contingencies. Rather than depend
on variations in the control over triggering outcomes, we assumed that
participants’ SoA would vary across trials based on monitoring out-
come identity (i.e. colour) and comparing that to their current knowl-
edge of action-outcome contingencies. In line with these predictions,
we found that agency ratings gradually increased across the block.
Finally, Supplementary analyses did not show any evidence of sensory
attenuation associated with the priming manipulation, nor any asso-
ciation between N1 amplitude and agency ratings (see Fig. 4f, and
Supplementary analysis C). Furthermore, whilst sensory attenuation
should increase as action-outcome contingencies are learned, we found
that Outcome FRN amplitude was most predictive of agency ratings at
the start of the block.
Several accounts would predict a larger FRN following unpredicted
or surprising outcomes (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Oliveira et al., 2007;
Wessel et al., 2012). Our FRN results could reﬂect larger Outcome FRN
being evoked in trials with outcome prediction errors, which were in
turn related to lower agency ratings. As action-outcome associations
were changed between blocks, prediction-errors and expectancy viola-
tions would be maximal at the start of a block. Consistently, we found
that the contribution of Outcome FRN to agency ratings gradually
reduced throughout the block (see Fig. S4, in Supplementary analysis
B). Our results further showed no eﬀects of priming or choice on
Outcome FRN. This suggests that priming did not aﬀect agency by
directly altering outcome processing, namely by disrupting outcome
predictions.
The FRN has been widely linked to negative outcomes (San Martín,
2012), such as monetary losses (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002), or no
reward relative to reward (e.g. Holroyd et al., 2009). Therefore, the
present Outcome FRN ﬁndings could also reﬂect varying aﬀective
evaluations of the outcome. As mentioned before, response conﬂict can
be considered aversive, and inﬂuence aﬀective responses to ensuing
events (Fritz and Dreisbach, 2013). Disruptions in action selection,
induced by incompatible priming, could have led to more negative
aﬀective responses to action outcomes, leading to larger Outcome FRN
and lower SoA.
Importantly, the relation between Outcome FRN and SoA was
independent of a possible link between Action CRN and conﬂict-
induced negative aﬀect. In modelling of agency ratings, we found no
relation between these two ERPs, suggesting that the Outcome FRN did
not directly reﬂect an aﬀective response linked to the preceding action.
Furthermore, Action CRN and Outcome FRN were signiﬁcant pre-
dictors of agency ratings, suggesting that they explained diﬀerent
portions of the variance. Outcome monitoring, as indexed by the
Outcome FRN, may be partly inﬂuenced by action monitoring signals,
but it also integrates information about the observed outcome, and
whether it matches internal models of action-outcome contingencies.
Our study supports the proposal that prospective, action selection-
based, and retrospective, outcome-based, cues can make independent
contributions to the SoA (Sidarus et al., 2013), at least when outcomes
are not highly predictable (Stenner et al., 2014; Stenner et al., 2015).
Common performance monitoring framework
Converging evidence shows that response-related negativities, i.e.
Action CRN/ERN, and the Outcome FRN have common neural
mechanisms, linked to the ACC (Botvinick, 2007; Frank et al., 2005;
Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Larson et al., 2014; San Martín, 2012). The
ACC is thought to be involved in goal-directed action, driving action-
outcome learning and adaptive behaviour (Botvinick, 2007; Holroyd
and Yeung, 2012). Monitoring actions and outcomes for response
conﬂict, errors, and negative or unexpected outcomes, the ACC can
signal a need for cognitive control. Structures such as the dorsolateral
pre-frontal cortex can in turn adjust current behavioural strategies or
internal models of action-outcome associations.
N. Sidarus et al. NeuroImage 150 (2017) 1–13
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Notwithstanding this commonality, action and outcome monitoring
use diﬀerent information, available at diﬀerent times. Action monitor-
ing relies on internal, prospective signals about action selection and
execution, whereas outcome monitoring depends on external, retro-
spective feedback processing in sensory areas. Here we saw that the
SoA was independently related to both Action CRN and Outcome FRN,
consistent with the idea that they integrate diﬀerent information.
Interestingly, a study has reported a disruption in ERN but intact
FRN in patients with schizophrenia (Horan et al., 2012), supporting a
dissociation between these two monitoring processes, and potentially
their role in SoA. Other studies have similarly suggested that schizo-
phrenia patients have impaired monitoring of internal, action-related
signals, and are instead over-reliant on external, outcome monitoring
(Metcalfe et al., 2012; Voss et al., 2010). Furthermore, the ERN is
sensitive to whether errors are internally or externally generated, e.g. a
response button malfunction (Gentsch et al., 2009; Padrao et al., 2016;
Steinhauser and Kiesel, 2011). Internally-generated errors led to a
large ERN, whereas externally-generated errors were associated with
later ERP components, arguably FRN-like (Gentsch et al., 2009).
Interestingly, with the exception of studies on error monitoring, the
ACC and ACC-mediated performance monitoring have rarely been
linked to SoA. The agency literature has typically employed consider-
ably diﬀerent tasks from the one used here, focusing especially on the
attributional aspect of agency, i.e. “who did it” (Chambon et al., 2014).
For example, participants may be asked to judge whether outcomes
were caused by oneself or another agent. This research has linked
sensorimotor control and outcome monitoring to the parietal cortex,
though other frontal and premotor areas have been implicated (David
et al., 2008; Farrer et al., 2008; Fink et al., 1999; Miele et al., 2011).
In contrast, our study focused on the instrumental aspect of agency,
involving monitoring and using more abstract action-outcome associa-
tions. As the ACC is involved in goal-directed actions and performance
monitoring more generally, it is especially relevant to this aspect of
SoA, rather than to agency attribution. The SoA is complex and
multifaceted, involving the integration of multiple signals, from inter-
nal sensorimotor signals, to external feedback, to higher-level beliefs
and inferences (Gallagher, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2013). We speculate
that regions previously associated with SoA may integrate signals from
the ACC with other inputs relevant to determining agency. The AG is a
likely candidate for this integration as it has been linked to a subjective
loss of agency associated with dysﬂuent action selection (Chambon
et al., 2013), as well as with unexpected outcomes (Farrer et al., 2003,
2008; Farrer and Frith, 2002; Nahab et al., 2011). The AG may
subserve an online monitoring system that tracks the whole intentional
action chain, from intentions, to actions, to outcomes, and signals a
loss of agency.
Conclusions
We found that an unconscious inﬂuence on action selection processes,
from subliminal priming, can aﬀect the conscious experience of agency over
action outcomes. ERP results showed that action monitoring signals
inﬂuence SoA prospectively, since the neural correlates of SoA emerge at
the time of the action, long before the outcome is known. The association
seen here between Action CRN and agency ratings mirrors associations
found between Action CRN/ERN and conﬁdence ratings (Boldt and Yeung,
2015; Scheﬀers and Coles, 2000). This suggests that the signals related to
action selection which inﬂuence SoA could be better described as relating to
conﬁdence in selecting or having selected the appropriate response, and not
only to selection ﬂuency as has been previously described (Chambon et al.,
2014; Wenke et al., 2010). Our results therefore link prospective sense of
agency to the processes of action monitoring and cognitive control. These
results invite speculations about possible functions of SoA within human
cognition generally. In particular, the SoA may provide an important
experiential marker, both for alerting to the need for corrective action, and
for guiding learning.
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